AI agents & MCP

@blursec/mcp turns the SDK into a Model Context Protocol server, so AI agents — Claude, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, your own agent loop — can query the stealer-log database and triage sessions as tools. It follows the same non-negotiables as the SDK: zero runtime dependencies, k-anonymity (only a 10-hex-char SHA-256 prefix leaves the machine), and explicit fail-open signaling.

When to reach for it

Security copilots / SOC chatbots — “is [email protected]’s password in any stealer log?” becomes a tool call instead of a dashboard hunt.
Incident-response agents — paste a suspect session token, get tokenType, compromised, severity, and a recommended action back.
CI / staging audits — let an agent sweep seeded test accounts via blursec_check_hash without any plaintext secret entering the model context.

What it is not for: the /login hot path. Agents add seconds of latency; the SDK’s 1500 ms credential check belongs in your server code, not behind an LLM.

Setup

Install once (or rely on npx):

npm i -g @blursec/mcp @blursec/sdk

Configuration is environment-only — the API key never appears in argv or prompt text:

env var	purpose
`BLURSEC_API_KEY`	API key (required)
`BLURSEC_ENVIRONMENT`	`production` (default) / `staging` / `local`

Claude Desktop / Claude Code

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "blursec": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@blursec/mcp"],
      "env": { "BLURSEC_API_KEY": "bsk_live_..." }
    }
  }
}

VS Code (GitHub Copilot agent mode)

.vscode/mcp.json:

{
  "servers": {
    "blursec": {
      "type": "stdio",
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@blursec/mcp"],
      "env": { "BLURSEC_API_KEY": "${input:blursec-api-key}" }
    }
  }
}

Any other MCP host

The binary is blursec-mcp; it speaks MCP over stdio (newline-delimited JSON-RPC). Point your host at the command and supply the env vars.

The tools

Tool	SDK surface	Notes
`blursec_check_credential`	`credentials.check(email, password)`	Hashes locally, transmits the 10-char prefix only. Optional `context` (`ip`, `userAgent`, `country`, `userId`, `deviceFingerprint`) feeds Layer-3 risk scoring.
`blursec_check_token`	`credentials.checkToken(token)`	Same model for session cookies / bearer tokens.
`blursec_check_hash`	`credentials.checkHash(sha256)`	Most private — the agent supplies a 64-char digest, so the raw secret never enters the conversation. For credentials: `SHA-256(lowercase(trim(email)) + ":" + password)`.
`blursec_verify_session`	`sessions.verify(token)`	Adds `tokenType` (`jwt`/`opaque`) and a `compromised` flag. JWTs are hashed by signature segment only.
`blursec_whoami`	`auth.whoami()`	Connectivity / key-scope sanity check.

Every check returns the same structured result the SDK gives application code: leaked, severity, recommendedAction, firstSeen, sources, failedOpen. Tool descriptions instruct the model to treat failedOpen: true as unknown, never as safe.

What’s intentionally missing

auth.rotate is not exposed. It revokes the live API key instantly — an autonomous agent calling it by mistake would disable leak protection for the whole integration. Rotate keys from your own tooling, with a human in the loop.

Example agent session

User: We got a phishing report for [email protected]. Can you check if her current session is compromised? Token: eyJhbGciOi... Agent: (calls blursec_verify_session) The session token matches a stealer-log entry first seen 2026-06-08 across 3 sources, severity high, recommended action force_reset. You should revoke her sessions and force a password reset.

Embedding without stdio

BlursecMcpServer is exported for in-process hosting (custom transports, tests, serverless wrappers):

import { BlursecMcpServer, createBlursecFromEnv } from "@blursec/mcp";

const server = new BlursecMcpServer(createBlursecFromEnv());
const reply = await server.handleLine(jsonRpcLine); // undefined = notification

Where AI does not belong

Two of the SDK’s invariants double as AI-integration rules:

Never put an LLM on the credential-check hot path. The 1500 ms timeout and fail-open behavior exist because this runs in front of /login. AI belongs before (risk-model-driven severityActions) or after (triage, remediation, reporting) the check.
Never let raw credentials reach a model. Hash first (hashCredential, then blursec_check_hash) or scrub (scrubPII) — prompts and traces count as “leaving the process”.

Getting started

Resources

Mcp

AI agents & MCP

When to reach for it

Setup

Claude Desktop / Claude Code

VS Code (GitHub Copilot agent mode)

Any other MCP host

The tools

What’s intentionally missing

Example agent session

Embedding without stdio

Where AI does not belong

​AI agents & MCP

​When to reach for it

​Setup

​Claude Desktop / Claude Code

​VS Code (GitHub Copilot agent mode)

​Any other MCP host

​The tools

​What’s intentionally missing

​Example agent session

​Embedding without stdio

​Where AI does not belong

AI agents & MCP

When to reach for it

Setup

Claude Desktop / Claude Code

VS Code (GitHub Copilot agent mode)

Any other MCP host

The tools

What’s intentionally missing

Example agent session

Embedding without stdio

Where AI does not belong